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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
In the Matter of the 
Estate of 
HARVARD L. WHEADON, 
Deceased. 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 15329 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The petitioners Iris Jensen and Ellen Piercy, nieces of 
the decedent Harvard L. Wheadon, filed a petition to admit a lost 
will and existing codicil to probate. They claim the provisions 
of the purported lost will make them the sole beneficiaries of 
the decedent's estate. The petitioner - objectors, George Wheadon, 
John Wheadon, and Bertha W. Tilbury, brothers and sister to the 
decedent, objected to the petition of the nieces, and filed their 
own petition claiming that the estate of the decedent should pass 
~ the intestacy laws of the State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the 
Petitioner-objectors George Wheadon, John Wheadon and Bertha W. 
Tilbury and against the petitioners Iris Jensen and Ellen Piercy. 
The trial court dismissed the petition of Iris Jensen and Ellen 
?iercy to admit the purported lost will and existing codicil to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
probate. The trial court also ordered the estate of Harvard 
Wheadon to be distributed according to the intestacy statutes 
of Utah in existence at the time of trial. The court reserved 
decision as to the appointment of an administrator or executor. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents George Wheadon, John Wheadon and Bert~· 
W. Tilbury seek affirmation of the trial court judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The decedent, Harvard L. Wheadon (hereafter decedent) 
died on April 14, 1976. He never married and left no issue. He 
was survived by the respondents, George Wheadon, John Wheadon and 
Bertha W. Tilbury, who are hi·s· brothers and sister. Another 
brother, Melvin Wheadon, died in 1971. The appellants, Iris 
Jensen and Ellen Piercy, are Melvin's daughters, and, of course, 
the decedent's nieces. 
No original will of the decedent could be found after 
his death although a careful, diligent search was made for it. 
The petitioners Jensen and Piercy introduced evidence 
tending to show that Harvard L. Wheadon executed a will on or 
about May 24, 1955 (hereafter 1955 Will). That will was apr:iarentl' 
prepared by an attorney, Everett Dahl, and witnessed by Mr. Dahl 
and his wife. In that will the decedent bequeathed all his 
property to Melvin and also named Melvin as executor. Shortly 
-2-
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after Melvin's death, the decedent apparently executed a codicil 
to the 1955 Will which codicil named Judy O. Burton and Sue O. 
Bateman as executrices. 
Evidence introduced at trial revealed that after Melvin's 
death, decedent had some conflicts with Melvin's daughters. Mrs. 
Burton indicated that shortly after Melvin died, Harvard Wheadon 
~ld her he felt hurt by actions of Melvin's daughters (TR 3-15 
through 3-17). He wanted them to sell him Melvin's property and 
felt badly when they would not. (Tr 3-16). In the latter part 
of 1971, Harvard Wheadon told his sister he was hurt and feeling 
badly because Iris Jensen and Ellen Piercy would not sell. Mrs. 
Tilbury recalled ". (H]e complained all the time that he 
didn't want to have anything to do with either one of them after 
that." (Tr 3-66). Harvard Wheadon apparently mentioned the 
mbject to Judy Burton as late as 1975 (Tr 3-18) . 
The evidence introduced at trial was that the 1955 will 
was delivered to the decedent. Mr. Dahl testified his usual 
practice in 1955 was to give the original will to a testator (Tr 
1-23). His testimony was: 
"So, the best of my recollection is that he 
(a testator) was given the original and my usual 
procedure was to also give him a copy." Id. 
Mr. Dahl had no recollection of deviating from this 
usual procedure insofar as Harvard Wheadon was concerned (Tr 2-
18) • 
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Ann Dahl, Mr. Dahl's wife and former secretary, similvl 
testified that Mr. Dahl's usual procedure in 1955 was to "I tell a I 
testator he should keep his will in a safety deposit box or leave 
it with the county clerk (Tr. 2-27). This testimony corroborated 
Dahl's own testimony that in 1955 he generally did not retain 
his client's wills because at that time he did not have an adequa) 
fireproof place in which to store wills (Tr. 1-23). Unless 
specifically requested, Dahl did not keep the original will of 
his clients in 1955. Id. There was no evidence that Harvard 
Wheadon ever asked Mr. Dahl to keep the 1955 will. 
There is however, additional evidence that the will was 
delivered to the decedent. In 1963 or 1964 Mr. Dahl and his 
former partner decided to go their separate ways. At that time a 
complete inventory of wills was prepared which included not onl\' 
original wills on file, but also copies of wills on file (Tr. 2-
5). From that inventory it was evident to Mr. Dahl that at least 
as late as 1964, he did not have the original will of Harvard 
Wheadon (Tr. 2-6). Mr. Dahl's records do indicate he kept the 
1971 codicil of Harvard Wheadon. After Mr. Wheadon's death, Mr. 
Dahl located that codicil. However, he did not find the origiMl 
1955 will--he only found an unsigned office copy of that document 
(Tr. 2-8). 
Harvard Wheadon maintained a safety deposit box at the 
West Jordan Branch of First Security Bank of Utah. He began 
renting that box on August 24, 1966. The decedent was the sole 
-4-
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owner of the box and the only person entitled to enter it (Tr. 3-
27). According to entrance tickets to that box, the decedent was 
the only person to enter the box while he was alive (Tr. 3-32). 
The last time the decedent entered the box before his death was 
on June 23, 1975 (Tr. 3-30). The bank has no record of anyone 
entering the box from that time until after Harvard Wheadon's 
death (Id.) 
None of the witnesses who appeared at trial testified 
to having seen the original 1955 will after the date it was 
signed. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Dahl had any recollection of seeing 
that document after May 24, 1955 (Tr. 2-19, 2-27). The secretary 
of Mr. Dahl who prepared the codicil never saw the 1955 will (Tr. 
2-35). And neither did Judy Burton (Tr. 3-21), nor Laurence Leak 
(Tr. 3-39) .. Similarly, John Wheadon and Bertha Tilbury denied 
having knowledge of that will (Tr. 3-59; Answer of Bertha Tilbury 
to petitioners' interrogatory nos. 1 through 3). 
Judy Burton did testify that in the month prior to his 
death she asked the decedent point-blank if he had a will. She 
stid the decedent replied: "Yes, it's in my safety deposit box." 
(Tr. 3-2, 3-3). This evidence was not introduced as evidence 
that Harvard actually had a will, but rather, counsel for the 
nieces introduced it for the limited purpose of showing the 
decedent's state of mind (Tr. 2-50, 2-51, 2-54 and 3-1). In any 
event nothing in that statement referred to the terms of the 1955 
Will or equated the alleged will in the safety deposit box with 
the 1955 Will. The following colloquy appears in the transcript: 
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Q. Indeed, you specifically asked him, "Harv, 
do you have a will?" 
A. I did. 
Q. And he said, as best you can recall, "Yes, 
and I keep it in my safety deposit box." 
A. He said, "Yes, I have it; I keep it," or, 
"!have it in my safety deposit box." 
Q. He didn't say, "I have an unsigned copy of 
a codicil in the safety deposit box," did he? 
A. No. 
Q. He said he had a will. He didn't say when 
he made that will; did he? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. He didn't define the terms of that will? 
A. No, he never did. 
Q. Didn't say that in that will he left 
to Melvin or his daughters? 
everythfr:I 
A. No, he didn't. I 
Q. Just said generally, "I have a will and I keep i 
it in my safety deposit box." 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. No equation with that will with any will 
executed in 1955; isn't that true? 
A. He did not mention what the will was or what 
it contained. 
(Tr. 3-19, lines 1 through 25) 
Of crucial significance is the fact that within a few 
days after Harvard's death, Judy Burton had the safety deposit 
box examined and neither the original nor any copy of the 1955 
will was there (Tr. 3-20). The box contained an unsigned copy of 
-6-
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i ~e 1971 codicil and some time certificates of deposits (Tr 3-11, 
J-20). Mrs. Burton admitted that based upon what Harvard had 
told her, she expected to find an original will in the box and 
was surprised when none was there (Tr. 3-20, 3-21). 
After he learned of the decedent's death, Mr. Dahl 
undertook an exhaustive search for the 1955 will. He checked his 
will inventory. He had his secretary physically inventory all 
cills on file to see if by any chance Mr. Wheadon's will had been 
misfiled (Tr. 2-9). He, himself, personally inventoried all 
wills in his possession (Id.). He supervised a thorough search 
of the decedent's home and went through all of his papers, drawers, 
I cupboards and desks. Judy Burton testified that in this 
··I search, contents of metal boxes were examined together with 
I papers in the kitchen and the bedroom. 
, single drawer in the house; [and] took everything out of every 
They went through "every 
"I 
: I 
1 
drawer and cupboard." (Tr.3-7). 
Mr. Dahl continued his search by checking with the 
secretary of his former partner to see if any will of decedent 
was there (Tr. 2-10). He contacted another attorney in Midvale 
and checked the records of the Salt Lake County Court to see if 
the will was there (Id). Finally, he directed Judy Burton to go 
to First Security Bank and check the contents of the decedent's 
safety deposit box @.). None of these efforts disclosed the 
existence of any will of the decedent. 
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Both Mr. Dahl and representatives of the bank denied 
ever withholding the 1955 or any other will from the decedent. 
(Tr 2-21, 3-32, 3-33). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT "IN EXISTENCE" 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 75-3-26 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 REFERS TO PHYSICAL AND NOT TO MERE LEGAL EXISTENCE. 
At the time of Harvard Wheadon's death and at the time 
of trial Section 75-3-26 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 containeci 
the following language which governs this case: 
"Proof of will lost or destroyed, 
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed 
will, unless the same is proved to have been in 
existence at the time of the death of the testator 
or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in 
the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provi-
sions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least 
two credible witnesses." (emphasis added) 
The petitioners Wheadon and Tilbury contend that when 
one reads the entire section of the statute, it is much more 
probable that "in existence" means physical existence as oppos~ 
to mere existence in contemplation of law. If the statutory term 
"in existence" does not require the physical presence of the 
will, the statutory language about fraudulent destruction within 
the testator's lifetime is gross surplusage. A will could not 
possibly be fraudulently destroyed during the testator's lifetime 
if the actual testamentary document did not need to be produced. 
-8-
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such a will, though not in actual existence would exist in contem-
plation of law and, thus, could not be fraudulently destroyed 
within the testator's lifetime. It is an obvious maxim of 
statutory construction that a statute should be construed in such 
a manner as to give effect to all its contents. 73 Am.Jur.2d 
Statutes,§ 191, pp. 389-390. 
From the plain language of Section 75-3-26 it is evident 
that its contents have to do with the evidentary requirements of 
proving a lost or destroyed will. The statute says that physical 
existence is not required if the will is shown to have been 
fraudulently destroyed during the testator's life. Otherwise, 
there must be proof that the will was in actual existence when 
the testator died. Section 75-3-26 does not address itself to 
revocation, but rather to evidentary sufficiency. Section 75-3-
26 does not conflict with Section 75-1-19 which deals with revoca-
tion of wills since each statute has a different purpose. Section 
75-1-19 deals with how a will may be revoked--not with evidentary 
questions of proof. Section 75-3-26 deals not with the substan-
tive question of revocation, but rather with the minimum evidentary 
conditions which must be shown before an alleged lost or destroyed 
will could be admitted to probate. See In re Estate of Strickman, 
55 Cal Rptr. 606, 608 (1966). 
Not only does the express language of the statute point 
~ the conclusion that "in existence" means physical existence, 
~t the only Utah case in point clearly assumes that "in existence" 
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means the physical reality of the testamentary document at the 
time of the testator's death. In the decision In re Frandsen's 
Will, 50 Utah 156, 167 Pac. 362 (1917), the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted the precursor of Section 75-3-26 and held that for 
purposes of the will statutes, when the testatrix in that case 
became insane, she was legally dead. A will was shown to have 
been in existence at the time the decedent lost her sanity. And 
since that will physically existed at the time of her insanity, 
it also existed at the time of her death for proof of will purposes. 
However, in order to get to the point that a testatrix's 
insanity equals death for proof of will purposes, the court 
assumed that "in existence", within the meaning of the statute, 
meant physical existence. The opinion contains the following 
language: 
" [O]n July 19, 1900 the testatrix then of 
sound and disposing mind and memory duly executed 
the will last proposed for probate and . . . de-
posited the same with the County Clerk of Carbon 
County; that thereafter and before any of the 
other proposed wills were executed, the testatrix, 
at least once, in the presence of one witness, 
saw the will in the County Clerk's office, and she 
then, and at other times according to the evidence, 
expressed herself as being satisfied with its pro-
visions; that the will was recorded in a book in 
the county clerk's office by a young lady who held 
some official position in said office; that the 
will was last seen in the County Clerk's office 
by the witnesses who testified at the hearing in 
March, 1912, and its contents were then examined 
by them." 50 Utah 160-161, 167 Pac:-aE 363 
(emphasis added). 
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"As we have seen the court found that on 
July 5, 1911 and on June 27, 1912, the testatrix 
'was not of sound mind or memory' and that she 
then was 'incapacitated from making, executing 
or-U"nderstanding a will.' We thus have a case 
where the will in question was shown to have 
existed some eight months after the testatrix 
had become insane, as found and declared by the 
court, which finding and declaration we have 
seen is binding upon us and upon the parties in 
interest." Id. (emphasis added) 
If all that were needed was that the will have legal 
existence, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to emphasize 
the physical existence of the 1900 will at and after the date the 
testatrix became insane. To counsel for the Wheadons and Mrs. 
Tilbury it appears that the court in Frandsen took it for granted 
that "in existence" meant physical presence. 
That conclusion is buttressed by further language from 
the Frandsen decision: 
"Now in this case it is conclusively shown 
that the will existed for a period of about 
eight months after the testatrix became insane 
and incapacitated from either making or revoking 
a will. True, the testator continued her physi-
cal existence. Her mind, however, the one thing 
necessary to make or revoke a will, was gone . 
Id. at 165, 167 Pac. at 365. (emphasis added) 
Again, if existence in contemplation of law were suffi-
cient, the court would not have emphasized the actual physical 
existence of the testamentary document itself. It would not have 
spoken of the will in the past tense. If existence in contem-
Plation of law were all that were required, the court would have 
regarded the will as a present and not a past item. Based upon 
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all the foregoing, it appears to counsel for the respondents t~~ 
the court in Frandsen understood the "in existence'' as used in 
the statute to mean physical existence. 
The court in Frandsen indicated that the Utah precursm 
of § 75-3-26 was similar to a California statute. The most 
recent California decisions these counsel have found construe "in 
existence" in the California successor statute to mean physical 
existence. In re Estate of Lane, 7 Cal.App.3d 402, 86 Cal. Rptr. 
620 (1970); In re Estate of Strickman, supra. 
As counsel for the appellants argue in their brief, an 
earlier California decision held that legal existence was suf-
ficient. In re Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 143 P.2d 689 
(1943)~ However, Bristol was a 4-3 decision and Justice Traynor 
wrote a stinging dissent which was cited with approval by the 
later California decision in Strickman. Strickman, supra, at 
608. In addition, Bristol has been criticized by at least one 
California scholar. Ferrier "Statutory Restrictions on Probate 
of Lost Wills," 32 California Law Review 221,223. 
If the later Calfornia decisions do not expressly 
reverse Bristol, they at least announce a departure from it and 
clearly set forth a physical existence criterion. 
In Strickman, the third page of a will could not be 
found, even though there was evidence that that page had origin-
ally been part of the will. A substitute page, unexecuted by the ' 
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testatrix was located, however. Witnesses identified the original 
first two pages and a copy of the original page 3. 
The California statute, Section 350 of the California 
Probate Code provided: 
"No will shall be proven as a lost or 
destroyed will unless proved to have been in 
existence at the time of the death of the 
testator, or shown to have been destroyed 
by public calamity, or destroyed fraudulently 
in the lifetime of the testator, without his 
knowledge; nor unless its provisions are 
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two 
credible witnesses." 
After reviewing with favor the Traynor dissent in 
Bristol, the intermediate appellate court held: 
"We have concluded that although the three-
page will of 1962 was validly executed, page 3 
thereof cannot be probated because it was no 
longer in physical existence at the time of the 
death of the testator." 55 Cal.Rptr. at 608. 
(emphasis added) 
In the decision In re Estate of Lane, supra, certain 
claimants under a 1963 will attempted to have that will admitted 
to probate. The petitioners could not produce the original 1963 
will, but had a copy which had been furnished by the attorney who 
prepared it. There was no evidence that the will was in existence 
at the time of the testatrix's death. The case arose under 
Section 350 of the California Probate Code cited earlier. 
The court affirmed a sum.~ary judgment against the 1963 
will claimants, holding: 
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"Insofar as lost or destroyed wills are 
concerned, those requirements are specifically 
spelled out in Probate Code Section 350. The 
words 'unless proved to have been in existence 
at the time of the death of the testator' may 
not be equated with proof the will has not been 
revoked. The word 'existence' used in the code 
section means 'physical existence' rather than 
'legal existence.'" Lane, supra, 86 Cal.Rptr. 
at 622 (emphasis added) . 
Another recent western state decision was In re Estate 
of Newman, 518 P.2d 800 (Mont. 1974). The applicable Montana 
statute, Section 91-1202, R.C.M., 1947, provided: 
"No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed 
will, unless the same is proved to have been in 
existence at the time of the death of the testator, 
or is shown to have been fratldulently destroyed in 
the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its pro-
visions are clearly and distinctly proved by at 
least two credible witnesses." 
In the course of the opinipn, the court cited its 
earlier decision in In re Colbert's Estate, 31 Mont. 461, 471, 78 
P.2d 971, 974: 
"Now, as we have heretofore seen, the statute is 
to the effect that the proponent of a lost will 
must prove either that the will was actually in 
existence at the time of the testator's death, or 
that it is in existence in contemplation of law. 
If it was fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime, 
it is still so in existence. If appellant cannot 
prove that the will was in existence, either 
actually or in contemplation of the law, at the 
time Colbert died, it follows that his case can-
not stand." Newman, supra, at 802-803. 
As is evident from the cited passage, Montana, like 
California, requires physical existence except where the will is 
shown to have been fraudulently destroyed during the testator's 
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lifetime. The existence in contemplation of law is not a blanket 
of abandonment of the necessity for proof of the will's physical 
existence at the time of the testator's death. Rather, physical 
existence is required except where the will is proved to have 
been fraudulently destroyed during the testator's lifetime. 
Other authorities could be cited, but respondents urge 
that the plain language of the statute, the Frandsen decision, 
and the cited California and Montana cases based on statutes 
similar to section 75-3-26 all indicate that "in existence" means 
physical existence. As a matter of policy the legislature of this 
state decided that lost or destroyed wills could only be proved 
by showing one of two things: 1) fraudulent destruction during 
the testator's life or 2) actual existence of the will after the 
testator's death. If the proponen~ of a purported lost or destroyed 
will cannot establish either fraudulent destruction or existence 
at the time of death, the document cannot be probated. 
For reasons set forth herein, it is urged that the 
better reasoned cases in states having statute's similar to 75-3-
26 require physical existence. The Frandsen decision seems to 
adopt the physical existence standard as the law of this state 
and the lower court properly applied that standard to the facts 
in this case. 
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POINT II. THE PRESUMPTION THAT A WILL MISSING AT THE TIME OF THE 
TESTATOR'S DEATH WAS DESTROYED BY HIM WITH INTENT TO REVOKE APPLIES 
IN THIS CASE AND WAS UNREBUTTED. 
The Frandsen decision cited earlier refers to the 
following general rule: 
"When it is shown that the testator made a 
will, but that it could not be found at his death, 
then, ordinarily, the presumption arises that he 
himself destroyed it for the prupose of revoking 
it before his death .... " Frandsen, supra, at 
161-162, 167 Pac. at 363-365. 
Although the court in Frandsen held that the presump-
tion is overcome where the testator has left his will with 
another and did not have access to it after its deposit and 
before his death, Frandsen, supra, at 165, 167 Pac. at 355, the 
general presumption does apply where the testator retained actual 
control of or had easy access to the will at the time it was last 
seen. The court in Frandsen cited with approval language from 
the case of Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653, where the New York 
court wrote: 
"If the will had remained in the custody of 
the testator, or if it had appeared that, after 
its execution he had access to it, the presump-
tion of law would be from the fact that it could 
not be found after his decease, that the same had 
been destroyed by him ... " 167 Pac. at 364. 
The evidence introduced at trial compels the conclusion 
that Harvard Wheadon either had or had access to the original 
will after its execution. The attorney who drafted the will 
indicated his policy, at the time the original will was signed, 
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was to leave the original with the testator, since at that time 
the attorney did not have a fire-proof safe. (Tr. 1-23, 2-18) 
The will file of that attorney did not reflect any original will 
kept by the attorney; (Tr. 2-6, 2-7) only the codicil. A diligent 
search disclosed no will. 
In their brief, appellants recognize the rule that 
where "a will was last known to be in the testator's possession 
and cannot be found after his death, the will is presumed to have 
been destroyed with the intent to revoke Appellant's 
Brief p. 16. Their only response is that the language of 75-3-26 
makes the presumption conclusive. This simply is not the case. 
If a proponent of a lost or destroyed will can prove fraudulent 
destruction of the will during the testator's lifetime, the 
physical document need not be produced. The problem the peti-
tioners have is they failed to prove any fraudulent destruction 
during the testator's lifetime or the actual existence of the 
will at the time of the decedent's death. 
Though witnesses testified the decedent felt his affairs 
were in order and remarked about the general advisability of 
having a will, the only evidence wherein the decedent allegedly 
specifically referred to the location of his will was in a conver-
sation with Judy Burton when he told her the will was in his 
safety deposit box. (Tr. 3-2, 3-3) It is to be emphasized that 
this statement was introduced not to show that the decedent 
actually had a will, but only to show his state of mind as to 
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whether he thought he had a will (Tr. 2-50). Of critical impor-
tance is that shortly after his death Mrs. Burton and others 
looked in the box and found no 1955 will - only a copy of the 
codicil. Mrs. Burton indicated she was surprised when no origin~ 
will was there. 
The Bank records indicated that the decedent was the 
only person who had access to the safety deposit box. Prior to 
his death no one but the decedent had been into the box. The 
decedent, however, had made rather frequent entries to the box 
prior to his death. There was no evidence that the decedent ever 
claimed to have lost the original will or surrendered its custody 
to third persons under circumstances where he was denied access 
to it. To the contrary, the evidence was clear that at least at 
some time after its execution, the decedent had the will or had 
access to it. 
The petitioners Wheadon and Tilbury contend that the 
better reasoned cases, which have considered the issue under 
facts similar to those in this case, hold that alleged statements 
of a testator prior to his death as to the existence of a will ~ i 
not destroy the general presumption of revocation. In the decision\ 
In re Casey's Estate, 127 N.J.Eq. 101, 11 A.2d 38 (1940), it I 
appeared that a testator made a will in 1937. The testator took 
the original will while his attorney kept an unexecuted copy. On 
frequent occasions thereafter the decedent-testator referred to 
the 1937 will. The last occasion he referred to the will was on 
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February 5, 1938. The following day, February 6, 1938, the 
testator-decedent disappeared and was never seen alive again. 
The coroner determined his death to have been on February 8, 
1938, and the cause thereof suicide. A diligent search for the 
1937 will was unsuccessful. 
The lower court held that the 
" ... proofs adduced were not sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of revocation which arose 
from the fact that deceased had possession of 
the will; that the proofs did not exclude every 
possibility of the destruction of the will by 
the deceased himself; and that under the proofs 
there was a possibility that deceased had des-
troyed his will animo revocandi between February 
5, 1938 and the date of his death [citation 
omitted]." 11 A.2d at 39. 
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the 
holding denying probate of the copy of the will. 
In In re Rokofsky's Will, 111 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Surr.Ct. 
1952), the decedent executed a 1948 will which could not be 
located after her death. One Miss Neuer, an attorney who drafted 
the 1948 will, testified that a short time before the testatrix's 
death she called Miss Neuer and indicated she lost the will while 
babysitting, but expressed her intention that the property be 
devised according to that will. The attorney indicated she would 
Prepare another will, but failed to do so before the decedent's 
death. 
The New York court referred to the rebuttable presumption 
that where a will is shown once to have existed and to have been 
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in the testator's possession, but cannot be found after his 
death, it is presumed to have been revoked. The court held: 
"The evidence offered in behalf of the 
petitioner consisted of the testimony of Miss 
Neuer concerning statements by the decedent to 
the effect that the December 4, 1948, will had 
been lost and that the decedent believed that 
certain of her relatives may have obtained 
possession of it and destroyed it. Such evi-
dence is incompetent to establish the fact 
that the will was not revoked during the dece-
dent's lifetime [citations]." 111 N.Y.S.2d at 
556. 
The court concluded: 
"The will of December 4, 1948 must be denied 
probate as the petitioner has failed to show 
either that the will was in existence at the 
time of the decedent's death or was fraudulently 
destroyed during her lifetime ." Id. at 557. 
And see In re Duffill's Estate, 5~ P.2d 185 (Cal.App. 1936), 
where the appellate court affirmed a decision of the trial court. 
In that case the alleged continuous declarations of a testator 
that he had a will which he kept in a metal strong box in his 
home did not constitute a preponderance of evidence sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of revocation when no will was found. I 
The presumption was unrebutted. The petitioners Jenser.\ 
and Piercy failed to sustain their burden of proof. And, conse- . 
quently, the trial court correctly directed a verdict against 
them. 
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POINT III. SINCE THE 1955 WILL IS PRESUMED DESTROYED AND REVOKED, 
THE 1971 CODICIL IS ALSO REVOKED. 
Since the appellants have failed to rebut the presump-
tion that a missing will is presumed destroyed with intent to 
revoke it, the 1955 will is presumed to be revoked. Section 74-
1-30 of the Utah Code Annotated which was in effect at the time 
of decedent's death and the time of trial provides: 
"Revocation revokes codicils - The revocation of 
a will revokes all its codicils." 
Since the 1955 will is presumed revoked, its revocation 
also revokes the 1971 codicil. 
For reasons set forth above, respondents urge that the 
presumed destruction of the 1955 will operated to revoke the 1971 
codicil. 
The lower court did not determine who was to be executor 
or administrator of the decedent's estate. Respondents urge that 
the administrator should be appointed pursuant to the intestacy 
statutes of Utah in effect at the time of decedent's death, since 
both the 1955 will and the 1971 codicil are deemed to be revoked. 
If, however, this court should determine that the 1971 codicil may 
be probated, respondents urge it be admitted for the sole purpose 
of naming the executrices. Otherwise the estate should pass by 
intestacy. In re Sapery, 28 N.J. 599, 147 A.2d 777 (1959). 
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POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFt:s: 
PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS OF ALLEGED NEWt 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
On pages 4 through 7 of the appellants' brief and unde: 
the heading of Statement of Facts, appellants refer to the conte~: 
of two affidavits submitted after trial. Naturally, respondents I 
did not have the opportunity to cross-examine any of the affiant: 
1 at trial, and respondents object to any use of the content of , 
those affidavits except insofar as those affidavits are used in / 
conjunction with appellant's alternative motion for a new trial. I 
Respondent's essential position is that the contents o: 
the two affidavits do not raise material issues which would 
justify a new trial. And in any event, the information in the 
affidavits was available to appellants long before trial. 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure lists I 
as one ground for granting a new trial: 
"(4} Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at trial." (emphasis added) 
Appellants moved that the trial court order a new tria'. I 
on precisely the same grounds it urges this court so to order. 
The trial court denied that motion. A major legal encyclopedia 
states as a general rule: 
. Granting of a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence is within the sound 
discretion of the court, not reviewable except 
for a palpable abuse of discretion. . " 5 Arn. Jur. 
2d Appeal and Error, § 851, p. 295 (1962). See 
also Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 124, 247 
P.2d 264, 265 (1952) where this Court wrote: 
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. . A wide discretion is reposed in the 
trial court in granting or denying a new trial 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence .... " 
And see further Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 
Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477, 478 (1955). 
In Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 47, 57 Pac. 712 (1899), 
the Utah Supreme Court wrote in an opinion dealing in part with a 
motion for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence: 
"The appellant contends that the court erred 
in refusing to grant a new trial based upon the 
affidavit of one Lamb because of newly discovered 
evidence. The facts presented in this affidavit, 
if true, would tend to impeach and contradict the 
testimony of the plaintiff. In some respects the 
testimony is cumulative, and no reason is shown why 
with reasonable diligence the witness Lamb could 
not have been produced at the trial. It is well 
settled that to entitle a defeated party to a new 
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence 
it must appear, 1st, that he used reasonable dili-
gence to discover and produce at the former trial 
the newly discovered evidence, and that his failure 
to do so was not the result of his own negligence. 
2d, That the newly discovered evidence is not simply 
cumulative. 3d, That such evidence is not sufficient 
if it simply be to impeach an adverse witness. 4th, 
It must be material to the issues and so important 
as to satisfy the court by reasonable inference that 
the verdict or judgment would have been different 
had the newly discovered evidence been introduced 
on the former trial. 5th, That the defeated party 
had no opportunity to make the defense, or was 
prevented from doing so by unavoidable accident, 
or the fraud or improper conduct of the other party 
without fault on his part [citations omitted]." 
Klopenstine, supra, at 55, 57 Pac. at 714 
(emphasis addea:r:-
And a Tenth Circuit case, Baruch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
172 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1949), contains the following language: 
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"It also seems to be the general rule that in 
the absence of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, 
the trial court will not grant a new trial on newly 
discovered evidence, which is intended to or has the 
effect of discrediting or impeaching the testimony 
of the movant's witnesses in the original trial 
[citations omitted]. The cases are not agreed upon 
what constitutes an unusual or extraordinary circum-
stance, but the manifest purpose of the rule is to 
discourage new trials based upon afterthoughts, 
while at the same time preserving the power of the 
court to correct gross injustice or to rectify a 
fraud. [citations omitted]." Id. at 445-446. 
(emphasis added) 
On page 38 of their brief the appellants recite: 
"The evidence which is newly discovered 
is that the objectors [Respondents] possibly 
had access to the document which cannot be 
found." (emphasis added). 
Of critical importance is that nowhere in any affidavi'. : 
did the uncrossexarnined affiants ever claim to have seen John 
Wheadon, Bertha Tilbury or Helen Sower with or looking for a 
will. Nowhere in any of the affidavits nor in any evidence 
i 
produced at trial was there any suggestion that the decedent ever I 
kept the will in the kitchen cupboard. 
had gone through that cupboard looking 
Even if Bertha and Hel~ I 
for documents (and they I 
have denied removing any such documents Tr. 3-76, 3-77, 3-72), 
evidence presented to date indicates the will was ever there. 
Judy Burton, the appellant's own witness, said she thought the 
no I 
I 
I 
alleged will was in the safety deposit box (Tr. 3-20). She also 
testified the decedent kept important papers in a tin box or 
boxes in the cellar (Tr. 3-7). And Judy Burton had the key to 
the box or boxes containing those papers (Tr. 3-22). In short 
nothing in the affidavits contains any substantive evidence 
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concerning the actual existence or location of the 1955 will as 
of the date of the "cupboard incident." 
Bertha Tilbury and Helen Sower were both examined by 
counsel for the appellants at trial with respect to the alleged 
cupboard search. John Wheadon was also subject to appellant's 
cross-examination generally. As early as August 5, 1976, in 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 2 of respondents' first set of 
interrogatories, appellants suggested that respondents "possibly 
had access to the documents which cannot be found." Appellant's 
Brief p. 38. Answers to Interrogatories by Mrs. Tilbury indicated 
that the Shepards and Grant Palmer were in the house when Bertha, 
John and Helen were. All this information was available to 
Jensen and Piercy well before the trial date. There is no indi-
cation that Mr. Palmer was unavailable at the time of triai. No 
attempt was made to have the deposition of the Shepards taken 
prior to trial, nor was a motion made to postpone the trial 
because their absence would prejudice Mrs. Piercy's and Mrs. 
Jensen's case. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, supra. 
At trial counsel for appellants presented a thorough, 
effective and lawyerlike exposition of their case. That presen-
tation emphasized the alleged legal existence of the will. 
Having lost on that theory, the appellants now wish to pursue a 
new theory, i.e. the possible disappearance of the will after the 
decedent's death. The purported facts contained in the affidavits 
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of the Shepards and Mr. Palmer filed after the trial are not 
illuminative as to the whereabouts of the 1955 will. At best, 
those affidavits only attack the credibility and ability to 
recall of John Wheadon, Bertha Tilbury and Helen Sower. 
The respondents urge that the alleged newly discovered 
evidenc_e is not "new." Even if it were, it could have been 
discovered ~{th reasonabi~ diligence on the part of Mrs. Jensen 
and Mrs. Piercy prior to trial. In any event, the allegations in I 
the Affidavits do not raise issues which justify holding a new / 
trial. Those allegations merely attack credibility of witnesses \ 
and require the broadest speculative leaps before they have any 
evidentiary value. The motion for new trial on grounds of newly 
discovered evidence should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly held that "in existence" 
within the meaning of Section 75-3-26 of the Utah Code requires 
proof of actual physical existence at the time of the testator's 
death. 
The appellants failed at trial to rebut the presumption 
.I 
that a will missing at the time of the testator's death is presume: I 
I 
destroyed by him with intent to revoke. 
Since the 1955 will is presumed destroyed and revoked, 
the 1971 codicil is also revoked. 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to grant a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and DATED this ~ day of 
November, 1977. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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